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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3847 
___________ 
 
JAVIER EMMANUEL DE LA CRUZ VARGAS, 
              Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency No. A045-026-366) 
Immigration Judge:  Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)  
November 6, 2013 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 07, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant, Javier De La Cruz Vargas, a national of the Dominican Republic,  
seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his 
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application for cancellation of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny in part 
and dismiss in part the petition for review.     
In 1995, at the age of five, Vargas was admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident (LPR).  In 2010, he was convicted in Pennsylvania for possession 
with intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-
113(a)(30).  As a result, he was charged with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined by 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B) (“illicit trafficking in a controlled substance”), and 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien convicted of a controlled substance violation.   
Vargas, proceeding pro se, challenged the aggravated felony charge and filed an 
application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
1
  The 
Immigration Judge (IJ) found that the government had not met its burden with respect to 
the aggravated felony conviction, but had established Vargas was removable for a 
controlled substance violation.  The IJ eventually determined that Vargas‟ conviction did 
not qualify as an aggravated felony, and that he was both eligible for and merited 
discretionary relief.  On appeal, the Board declined to address the propriety of the IJ‟s 
determination regarding Vargas‟ eligibility for cancellation of removal, finding that 
Vargas had failed to show that his positive equities outweighed his ongoing criminal 
                                              
1
  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), the Attorney General may exercise his discretion to 
cancel removal if the alien meets his burden to establish he is eligible for cancellation  
of removal.  See Pareja v. Att‟y Gen. of U.S., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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activities such that discretion should be exercised in his favor.  See In re Sotelo-Sotelo, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 201, 203 (BIA 2001) (noting that, in determining eligibility for 
cancellation of removal, it must “balance the positive and adverse matters to determine 
whether discretion should be favorably exercised”) (citation omitted).  It therefore 
reversed the IJ‟s order and denied the application for cancellation of removal as a matter 
of discretion.  Vargas has timely petitioned for review.
2
  
We must first address the government‟s argument that we lack jurisdiction to 
entertain the petition for review because Vargas challenges the Board‟s discretionary 
decision to deny cancellation.  We lack jurisdiction over petitions for review challenging 
the Board‟s discretionary determinations, including cancellation of removal.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).  We nevertheless retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims 
and questions of law pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  “Our jurisdiction in that 
respect is „narrowly circumscribed‟ in that it is limited to „colorable claims or questions 
of law.‟”  Pareja, 615 F.3d at 186.  A claim is not “colorable” if “it is immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and 
frivolous.”  Id. (citation omitted).    
Vargas presents two primary issues on appeal.  We will address our jurisdiction 
over each issue separately.  See id. at 187 (citation omitted). 
                                              
2
  While the petition was pending, the Board denied Vargas‟ motion for reconsideration.  
Vargas did not file a petition for review of that decision, so it is not before us.   
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Vargas first claims that the Board failed to defer to the IJ‟s factfinding and instead 
engaged in impermissible factfinding in determining he was ineligible for discretionary 
relief.   The BIA may not reverse an IJ‟s factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), and may not engage in its own factfinding in the 
course of deciding the appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).  We have jurisdiction under § 
1252(a)(2)(D) to review a claim that the BIA violated its own regulations by engaging in 
impermissible factfinding.  See Chen v. Dep‟t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 
2006) (holding that a petition raises a question of law when it alleges a “fact-finding 
which is flawed by an error of law” or an “abuse of discretion” that is “based on a legally 
erroneous standard”).   
Vargas maintains that the Board made improper findings with respect to his 
criminal history.  First, he argues that the Board improperly found that he had “failed to 
present any documentary evidence to support his limited role in his most recent crime.”  
We need not address the propriety of this finding because the Board specifically stated 
that, “even if his role was limited,” Vargas was not entitled to discretionary relief.   
Next, Vargas argues that the Board‟s findings that he had been involved in a 
“pattern of criminal activities” which lasted “for much of his life here” and “only ended 
when he was taken into custody” are contrary to the IJ‟s findings “regarding the breadth 
and chronology of his criminal history.”   The BIA reviews de novo whether the IJ‟s 
decision to grant discretionary relief was warranted based on the record, see 8 C.F.R. § 
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1003.1(d)(3)(ii), and the BIA permissibly did so here.  With respect to his criminal 
history, the IJ noted that he had been arrested twice for possession of marijuana and 
convicted once for possession with intent to sell marijuana; he also noted that Vargas was 
only 15 when he began to sell marijuana.  The BIA echoed the IJ‟s findings. It noted his 
criminal offense history,
3
 including the fact that he had “admitted to selling marijuana, 
starting at a young age.”  Its characterization of the criminal history as a “pattern of 
criminal activities” is merely an assessment of the facts established in the record and does 
not constitute improper factfinding.  The fact that the IJ emphasized Vargas‟ immaturity 
and that he was “not a hardcore trafficker,” while the BIA emphasized his “criminal 
activities” and that “any sale of drugs is highly serious,” is a matter of discretion, not 
factfinding.  See Wallace v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) 
(“[A] review of the factual record by the BIA does not convert its discretionary 
determination as to whether a petitioner warrants [relief] into improper factfinding.”).   
Vargas‟ second claim, that the BIA gave insufficient consideration and weight to 
certain discretionary factors in denying cancellation of removal, does not raise a 
colorable claim for review.  The BIA‟s decision makes clear that it balanced the equities 
pursuant to In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (BIA 1978), including the “significant 
positive factors” which it noted weighed in support of the application.  See Tipu v. INS, 
                                              
3
   There is no support for Vargas‟ contention that the Board impermissibly determined he 
had a “series of convictions.”   Albeit inexact, the phrase referred to the same criminal 
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20 F.3d 580, 583 (3d Cir. 1994) (endorsing the Marin approach).   It properly considered 
established facts weighing against Vargas, such as his minimal work history and his 
children‟s reliance on public assistance.  See Yusupov v. Att‟y Gen. of U.S., 650 F.3d 
968, 980 (3d Cir. 2011) (the BIA may evaluate evidence established in the record which 
the IJ may not have taken into account).  There is no indication that the BIA failed to 
consider evidence which was material to Vargas‟ application.  See, e.g., Escobar v. 
Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Even though our review is deferential, the 
[Board] may not simply overlook evidence in the record that supports the applicant‟s 
case.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).   The BIA‟s decision, which was 
adequately explained and supported by the record, is purely an exercise of discretion 
which we lack jurisdiction to review.  See Cruz-Camey v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 28, 29 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (holding that no jurisdiction exists to review the manner in which the BIA 
balanced the various positive and negative factors which typically inform the exercise of 
its discretion under § 1229b(a)); Delgado-Reynua v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 596, 599-600 
(5th Cir. 2006) (holding that no jurisdiction exists to review a claim that “the BIA 
improperly conducted de novo review, rather than reviewing the IJ‟s decision for clear 
error, when it reweighed the facts relevant to the grant of discretionary relief”).4 
                                                                                                                                                  
history that the IJ had noted, including the two New York arrests and the Pennsylvania 
conviction.  Notably, the IJ also referred to the two New York arrests as “convictions.” 
4
     Vargas testified at the hearing that his parents both lived in the United States, but 
were in the Dominican Republic at the time of the hearing.  As part of this claim, Vargas 
argues that the BIA improperly found that he had “familial connections to the Dominican 
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Based on the foregoing, we will deny the petition for review to the extent it raises 
any questions of law and dismiss it to the extent it challenges the discretionary 
determination of the BIA.   
                                                                                                                                                  
Republic in the form of his parents,” and weighed it against him.  This misreads the 
BIA‟s opinion, which concluded that he had family ties there and that his parents were 
there at the time of the hearing: “Although he is close with his sisters in the United States, 
he also has family ties in the Dominican Republic where both of his parents were at the 
time of the hearing.”  Significantly, Vargas does not challenge the BIA‟s conclusion that 
he had any ties to the Dominican Republic.     
 
